Premises about human nature
A common refrain I hear in the blogosphere is about "mad mullahs" and the possibility that Iran might destroy Israel, or subsidize a nuclear attack via terrorist proxies on a US city. Of course, if the state of Iran does such a thing then it seals its own fate in a self-induced Götterdämmerung as it invites massive nuclear retaliation from either the US or Israel. How plausible is this scenario? In my opinion, not very, and the reason is simple: the commanding heights of government does not select for individuals with suicidal intent because those individuals are not by their nature good at manipulating politics and playing the "game." To put a not too fine point on it, political leadership tends to select for a somewhat craven sort, the Churchill's of the world stand in contrast to the run of the mill political leader, and this includes autocrats like Stalin or Hitler. The idea that Iran would engage in a nuclear attack proactively seems to defy a host of premises that I hold in regards to the nature of politics and human psychology. My premises could be incorrect of course, but the issue I tend to be having is that those who make pronouncements about the mad intent of the mullahs on the whole share these same premises about human nature from all I can tell. In their day to day lives they make situational allowances for the needs of political expedience, but in this case they do not. The key here I suspect is that individuals are making a cost vs. benefit analysis, "what if Iranian leaders really are suicidal and there is no accountability and check on any level of government on their impulses?" Note that there are intersecting conditional probabilities here, but, even given all these, some would justify invasion on the grounds of even the smallest possibility of nuclear attack. Well, all I would offer in response is this:
a) Let's not pretend that conquering a coherent nation of 70 million won't entail massive costs on "our" end (whoever "we" are).
b) Let's not pretend as if the risk that we are mitigating is a high one.
a) Let's not pretend that conquering a coherent nation of 70 million won't entail massive costs on "our" end (whoever "we" are).
b) Let's not pretend as if the risk that we are mitigating is a high one.
Comments
Your application of evolutionary analysis to the efficacy of deterrence sounds good, but I humbly ask you to consider:
1. Iran and NK ran a substantial risk in pursuing nuclear weapons in the first place. Indeed, given the demonstrated will and means of the U.S. to destroy regimes that attempt to acquire them (Saddam Hussein's), their nuclear programs were suicidally risky, once you note that they appear to be safe bets only in hindsight. So the Iranian and NK appetite for risk in the pursuit of their objectives is demonstrably substantial.
2. And what about our risk-calculus? It appears that your cost-benefit analysis leads you to recommend acquiescence to their nuclear ambitions, on the grounds that the costs of preemption could be substantial and they wouldn't dare use them. But what if they threaten to use them unless we do or stop doing XXXX? Short of XXXX = "submission to foreign occupation", XXXX will inevitably seem the safe option, considering the possible alternative, regardless of our retaliatory capability. We have that ability now, and seem unwilling to use it, hardly an encouraging precedent.
My point is that, yes, there are costs and risks associated with preemption, but that those costs and risks are presently at a minimum, compared with what they will be. (Unless preemption means an Iraq-style counterinsurgency, which I would NOT recommend.)
And Iran also had no risk. They are essentially immune to land invasion. Iraq was easy pickings bbut no rational analyst ever thought we could pull the same feat on Iran, even before we committed to Iraq.
Further, a land invasion is not what I would recommend, but rather airstrikes against known and suspected nuclear and missile facilities. This limited approach would almost certainly be effective in the case of Iran. Granted, it would not protect Seoul from NK artillery, so this artillery would have to be added to the target list.
But I would dispute the notion that Iran is immune from land invasion. Our military has shown itself to be extrememly capable at projecting force into the most hard-to-reach places against conventional targets. (But we suck at counterinsurgency; see above.)
As for Seoul, we need to quantify our risk analysis. If "no one wants to risk Seoul," does that mean that we should meet ANY NK demand to preserve it? Where do we draw the line? And what happens when not just Seoul, but Tokyo and Honolulu are at risk as well? The psychology of appeasement has no logical end point.